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SYMPOSIUM ON WATER LAW

MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO: PROTECTING
ESTABLISHED WATER USES IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST,
DESPITE THE RULES OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
By

REED D. BENSON*

Water law in the Northwest states has long been based on the well-established
rules of the PriorAppropriationDoctrine.In recent years, however, the four
Northwest states often have not applied these rules against existing water
users. State legislatures, courts, and water resource agencies have routinely
changed the rules, or refused to implement them, if doing so might curtail
current uses. This Article examines the ways in which the Northwest states
have maintainedthe water use status quo despite the traditionalrules. The
Article then evaluates the economic and environmental implicationsof state
efforts to protect existing water uses, and assesses how these efforts may affect other water users.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For decades, water law in all four Pacific Northwest states (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana) has been based on the prior appropriation doctrine.1 That doctrine has been a fixture in the western United
States for over a century, 2 and the fundamental rules of water law based
on prior appropriation are well established. These basic rules provide
water users with a high degree of certainty and security, creating private
property rights to use 3 a resource that is owned by the public, 4 but they
also limit water use in some significant ways. For example, the traditional
rules restrict where, when, how, and how much water may be used, and
specify how water rights may be established and lost. 5
The Northwest's water resources and those who rely on them have
come under increasing stress in recent years. Causes of this stress include
overappropriation, drought, population growth, the decline of salmon and
other fish populations, aquifer depletion, water quality impairment, assertion of tribal water rights, increasing competition for water supplies, public demands for environmental protection, and other factors. 6 These
1 The prior appropriation doctrine was established in the Idaho Constitution, dating to
1889. Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3. In Montana, the doctrine is rooted in statutes of the 1860s
and 1870s. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 201 P. 702, 706-07 (Mont. 1921). Oregon codified prior
appropriation as the law of the state in 1909. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.110-537.330 (1997). Washington followed suit in 1917, becoming the last state in the West to adopt a comprehensive
water code. Wick Dufford, Washington Water Law: A Primer, 11 ILLAHEE 29, 31 (1995);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.005-90.03.611 (1992 & Supp. 1998).
2 JOSEPH L. SAx ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 318-33 (1991).
3 "[Pirivate ownership of stream water while in its natural environment does not exist;
but private rights to abstract and use such waters-under State supervision and control in
the exercise of its police powers-do exist, and they are property rights." 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 443 (1971).
4 The laws of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington each recognize that the waters
of the state are owned by the public. IDAHO CONsT. art. XV, § 1; IDAHO CODE § 42-101 (1996 &
Supp. 1998); MONT.CONST. art. IX, § 3(3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-101 (1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 537.110 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005 (1992 & Supp. 1998).
5 See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
6 See generally DEBORAH MOORE ET AL., RESTORING OREGON'S DESCHUTES RIVER: DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIPS AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE WATER QUALITY AND INSTREAM FLows
(1995) (documenting environmental trends and conditions in the Deschutes River Basin);
IDAHO WATER REsOuRCE BD., IDAHO STATE WATER PLAN

(1997)

PLAN] (commenting on Idaho water policies and objectives).

[hereinafter IDAHO WATER
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factors have helped create and exacerbate water conflicts, often forcing
the states to face difficult issues they had long avoided.
In facing these issues, the states commonly have not applied the
traditional rules of western water law. Instead, states often have effectively waived or abandoned these rules in order to preserve existing
water-use practices. State deference to existing water uses takes many
forms, from silent yet unmistakable failures to enforce long-standing
rules, 7 to changes in state statutes for the express purpose of allowing
established uses to continue.8
The accommodation of status quo water uses is now the overarching
principle of Northwest water policy. Simply put, the Northwest states protect water users' established practices more faithfully than their legal
rights. Where existing water uses are inconsistent with traditional rules of
water law, the states have often bent, changed, or ignored those rules in
order to preserve these established practices. 9 This unwritten policy favors those appropriators whose uses would be curtailed by a straightforward application of water law principles and disadvantages others,
including other existing water users, prospective new users, and those interested in restoring instream flows, who would benefit if these principles
were implemented. 10
Many of the traditional rules of western water law are fading in practical importance as legislatures, courts, and agencies protect existing
water uses from the application of these rules. The states' policy of protecting existing uses seems to be based on considerations of politics, economics, and equity. But this policy may damage other water users, impair
instream flows, limit economic opportunities, and ultimately create
greater uncertainty about water use and management.
This Article examines the unofficial status quo policy of the Northwest states. Part I provides a brief background on water use in the Northwest and on the traditional rules of western water law. Part II sets out the
basic precepts that states follow to allow the continuation of existing uses,
and identifies specific instances where states have protected the status
quo by failing to enforce traditional water law rules, changing those rules,
precluding state curtailment of ongoing uses, or insulating those uses from
the effects of instream demands. Part III considers the implications of
abandoning the traditional rules to preserve the status quo, discussing
how this practice might change "winners" and "losers" among water interests and perpetuate economic concerns regarding water use. The Article
concludes with an explanation of how the protection of status quo water
uses may alter assumptions and arguments about future water policy for
the Northwest.

7 See infra notes 55-94 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra notes 176-213 and accompanying text.
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A. Water Use in the Northwest
People not familiar with the Pacific Northwest, and even some who
are, often believe the region is far wetter than it really is. The region's
legendary rainfall is not evenly distributed, and the area east of the Cascades is typically quite dry." In Idaho, average annual precipitation in the
mountains exceeds sixty inches, but most of the state receives less than
twenty inches. 12 Even west of the Cascades, where winter precipitation is
generally abundant, many streams run short of water in the summer and
fall. In the Dungeness and Quilcene basins on Washington's Olympic Peninsula, for example, low streamflows are a chronic problem. 13 Given the
demands for water to meet existing and new uses, both instream and outof-stream, most of the Northwest does not have enough water.14
Irrigation is, by far, the dominant out-of-stream water use in the region. Irrigation accounts for over eighty-seven percent of total water withdrawals in the Northwest' 6 and nearly ninety-seven percent of the region's
water consumption. 16 The next largest water use, public supply, accounts
for less than five percent of withdrawals, while industrial withdrawals are
less than three percent. 17 The percentages vary somewhat by state. In
Idaho, for example, irrigation accounts for ninety-five percent of water
withdrawals and livestock use exceeds public supply and industrial with11 See Michael C. Blumm, Seven Myths of Northwest Water Law and Associated Stories,
26 ENVTL. L. 141, 142 (1996).
12 IDAHO WATER PLAN, supra note 6, at 25.
13 "[A] discrepancy exists between the quantity of water needed for optimal fish production and the needs of out-of-stream uses. The gap between the needs of the fish expressed
by recommended instream flows, and the present instream flow after withdrawals for agriculture, municipal, business and future growth needs is substantial." Dungeness-Quilcene
Water Resources Management Plan xiv (submitted to the Washington Department of Ecology under the Chelan Agreement, June 30, 1994).
14 As stated recently by Oregon's water management agencies,,
The soggy winter and spring climate of Oregon's northwest quarter have given the
state a reputation for water abundance that obscures an important fact: each year the
state's water supply falls far short of the demands placed on it. Across Oregon, many
streams are dry in the summer and fall months. Significant natural flow reserves for
new or expanded uses do not exist. In many places, sufficient flows for existing uses
do not exist-and haven't for decades. In more and more areas, we are facing uncertainties about groundwater reserves. All over the state, prospective users are competing for the last drops of available water. Put very simply, there is not enough water
where it is needed, when it is needed, to satisfy existing and future out-of-stream and
instream uses. This situation seriously limits the ability of Oregon's economy to grow
and threatens the long-term sustainability of the natural systems our economy relies
upon.
OREGON WATER RESOURCES COMM'N & DEP'T,

1995-1999

STRATEGIC WATER RESOURCE MANAGE-

MENT PLAN 2 (1995) (emphasis added).
15 WAYNE B. SOLLEY ET AL., ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN

1990, at 12

(U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1081, 1993). This publication defines the Pacific Northwest
to include all of Washington, virtually all of Oregon except for the Klamath Basin, all of
-Idaho except for the Bear Lake Basin, and those portions of Montana and Wyoming which
are part of the Columbia Basin.
16 Id. at 9, 35.
17 Id. at 12.
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drawals combined.18 In Washington, the most urbanized of the Northwest
states, public supply makes up eleven percent of water withdrawals and
industrial use more than six percent, but irrigation still exceeds seventysix percent of total withdrawals. 19
Water withdrawals have sharply depleted streamflows in many North
west rivers. 20 As in other parts of the West, state efforts to protect instream flows have been too little and too late to keep rivers from drying
up. 2 1 Also, water diversions and low streamflows have seriously harmed
fish and other aquatic and riparian organisms. 22 Inadequate instream flows
related to water withdrawals are a continuing and significant problem for
23
western rivers and aquatic ecosystems.
These water use patterns of the Northwest are not a recent development. They have been firmly established for decades, within the framework of state water laws based on the bedrock principles of the venerable
18 Id. at 13.
19 Id.
20 Instream flow problems in the Northwest have not been intensively studied, so it is

difficult to know their full severity and extent. A recent report on Northwest salmon declines notes that even though cropland agriculture affects vast areas of the Columbia River
Basin
[n]o comprehensive review of the effects of cropland agriculture on fish habitat in the
Columbia basin exists, as far as we know. Farming can significantly alter hydrology
and increases erosion and sedimentation processes many-fold over natural rates....
The principal effects of cropland agriculture on fish in the Columbia Basin no doubt
stem from flow diversion and withdrawal for irrigation.
THE INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC GROUP, RETURN TO THE RIvER: RESTORATION OF SALMONID FISHES

IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER ECOSYSTEM 145 (prepublication copy, Sept. 10, 1996) (citing NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1995)).
21 See TIM PALMER, THE SNAKE RIVER: WINDOW TO THE WEST 96-99 (1991).
22 See Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: EndangeredFish
Versus IrrigatedAgriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 319 (1996). Several panels of scientists
recently reported on the factors affecting aquatic ecosystems in the West. See also AQUATIC
ECOSYSTEMS SymPOSIuM, REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION

(W. L. Minckley ed., 1997) (also available from the National Technical Information Service,
5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161; phone (703) 4874650). The scientists repeatedly identified water diversions and low flows as a major problem.
Irrigated agriculture is traditionally the most insatiably thirsty activity in the West.
Stream diversion for irrigation may reduce surface flows to a level insufficient to
maintain riparian vegetation, while groundwater pumping lowers local and regional
water tables and reduces stream flow, either of which can eliminate or weaken riparian vegetation.
Id. at 19. "Pumping, diverted flows, and channel entrenchment dried some habitats, an event
fatal for a fish in a few minutes and extirpating whole communities when dams blocked
reinvasion when and if flow resumed." Id. at 65.
23 One report has noted the following:
Historical degradation of surface-water habitats has left their biota even more vulnerable to present-day stresses. Ongoing practices which continue to degrade .aquatic
ecosystems include: flow regulation, diversion, and groundwater mining, which distort hydrologic regimes and eliminate, simplify, or fragment habitats;... [and] profligate agricultural irrigation, depleting and polluting surface waters ....
AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 22, at 47. The report also identified three other
practices that harm aquatic ecosystems: introduction of alien species, unregulated land use
practices by extractive industries, and urbanization. Id. at 48-52.
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prior appropriation doctrine. The following subsection briefly examines
some of these principles.
B. The TraditionalBasic Rules of Western Water Law
Western water law under the prior appropriation doctrine essentially
is based on a handful of fundamental and long-standing rules. These few
traditional rules are clearly established and simple to state, if not to apply.
In general terms, these rules follow.
1. State Control of Waters
Perhaps the most basic rule of western water law is that the states
control the use of water, which state laws declare to be a public resource.24 States provide for private rights to use water, but those rights
may be established only as authorized by the states. 25 Moreover, exercise
26
of such rights is subject to state administration and enforcement.
2. State Approval of Water Rights
The traditional steps needed to establish a water right are intent, diversion of water from its natural source, and application of water to a
beneficial use. 27 Today, however, new appropriations may be made only
28
on the basis of a permit issued by a state water resource agency.
3. Firstin Time, First in Right
A water right's priority is based on the date of appropriation, and the
oldest rights have the highest priority. 29 Where water is insufficient to satisfy all rights, junior appropriators' withdrawals are curtailed so that users
30
with senior rights may continue to receive their full water supply.
4. Beneficial Use Without Waste
Water may be appropriated only for a specified "beneficial use," and
water rights authorize the use only of enough water to satisfy that benefi24 In all four Northwest states, water is legally owned by the public. See supra note 4.
25 HUTCHINS, supra note 3, at 400-04.
26 Id. at 304-06, 443.

27 NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, A SuMmARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 29 (Richard L.
Dewsnup & Dallin W. Jensen eds., 1973).
28 Id. at 30. All four Northwest states now require a permit application to establish a new
water right. IDAHO CODE § 42-202 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-302 (1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 537.130 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.250 (1996). "If the application is approved, it is
only an inchoate right, to be perfected by exercising reasonable diligence in constructing
necessary works and facilities and applying the water to use." NATIONAL WATER COrmM'N,
supra note 27, at 31.
29 See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 27, at 29.
30 Id. at 32.
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cial use. 31 In addition, water uses must be reasonably efficient; no one has
32
a legal right to "waste" water.
5. Appurtenancy
Water rights usually specify a particular place, as well as type, of beneficial use. 33 In most states, water rights are appurtenant to a specific
par35
cel of land, 34 and may not be used elsewhere without a transfer.
6. ConditionalTransferability
The holder of a water right may change its point of diversion, place,
or purpose of use, but only with prior state approval. 36 Any such change,
however, must not injure the rights of other appropriators, 3 7 whether junior or senior to the right being transferred.
7. Use It or Lose It
A water user may lose her water right by failing to exercise it, either
by nonuse of water for a period of years (forfeiture) 38 or nonuse coupled
39
-with evidence of intent to abandon the right (abandonment).
The foregoing list does not attempt to identify all the rules of western
water law, or provide a detailed analysis of individual rules. It does, however, provide a brief summary of the most fundamental and familiar points
of the prior appropriation doctrine. In theory, these traditional rules form
the basis of water law in the Northwest states. As the following section
explains, however, these rules are often sacrificed for the protection of
existing water uses.
31

Id:

32 As stated by the National Water Commission,
[i]f water is used inefficiently, so that the use is wasteful, it is an illegal use, and is
beyond the scope of the appropriation right....
If the method of use is unreasonably inefficient, then the difference between the
amount of water actually diverted and the amount reasonably required under an effi-

cient use is the amount that is being wasted. Thus, the water right is valid, but the
appropriator can be required to improve his efficiency and to avoid committing waste.
And this applies to waste of water by excessive or unnecessary application (as an
unneeded irrigation) as well as inefficient facilities (such as ditches that lose exhorbitant [sic] amounts to seepage).
Id. at 34.
33 HUTCHINS, supra note 3, at 454-55.
34 Id. As a matter of federal law, water from Bureau of Reclamation projects has been

appurtenant to the land irrigated since the 1902 Reclamation Act. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994).
35 Statutes of all four Northwest states require a transfer to approve a change in place of
water use. IDAHO CODE § 42-222(1) (Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2402(1) (1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 540.51.0(1) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.380 (Supp. 1997).
36 NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 27, at 37, 39.
37 Id. at 37-39.
38 Id. at 42. All four Northwest states have statutes providing that water rights may be
forfeited if not used for a specified period of years without adequate justification. IDAHO
CODE § 42-222(2) (Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2404(2) (1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 540.610 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.14.160 (1996).
39 NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 27, at 41.
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THE STATUS Quo POLICY IN THE NORTHWEST

The Northwest states remain officially committed to the prior appropriation doctrine.4 0 In reality, however, the states often effectively waive
the traditional rules where they threaten to curtail established water uses.
States have routinely bent, changed, or ignored the traditional rules,
through action or inaction, in order to maintain such uses. As a practical
matter, water management in the region today is based less on strict prior
appropriation principles than on protection of the status quo, that is, preservation of the water use practices, legal or not, that have become established in an area.
"Where is the inconsistency?" the reader may ask. "Isn't prior appropriation itself based on protection of existing uses?" Certainly the traditional rules of western water law protect these uses in many ways, but the
rules also establish limits to that protection. For example, users who violate the limits of their water rights by exceeding the specified rate, duty, or
season of use, or applying water to unauthorized lands, are not protected
.by the traditional rules. 41 Nor are users protected who fail to use their
water rights for an extended period, 42 who waste water,43 or who do not
observe legal requirements for establishing or maintaining a water right.4
Junior appropriators are not protected from being shut off in favor of seniors during times of shortage, even if the juniors have not previously
been subject to such regulation. 45 And the traditional rules do not prevent
water from being used in new places or for new purposes, so long as such
46
changes injure no other appropriators and are approved by the state.
Clearly then, the traditional rules of western water law do not provide
absolute protection to existing water uses.
Two points must be noted at the outset of this discussion of the
states' practice of protecting established water uses. First, there is no inherent conflict between preserving the status quo and applying traditional
water laws. To the contrary, maintaining the status quo is fully consistent
with prior appropriation rules so long as 1) all users' rights are clearly
established, 2) water has been consistently well managed (based on good
40 Idaho, for example, recently adopted a state water plan that emerged "from a vision of
Idaho in which water is used efficiently, and is allocated through laws that fully conform to
the prior appropriation doctrine." IDAHO WATER PLAN, supra note 6, at 4. Oregon's water
resource agencies recently stated that while much has changed in Oregon since the adoption
of the 1909 Water Code, "the fundamental principles of prior appropriation, beneficial use
and the attachment of a water right to the land have remained intact." OREGON WATER RESOURCES COMM'N & WATER RESOURCES DEP'T, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR MANAGING OREGON'S WATER
RESOURCES 1 (1997).
41 See generally NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 27, at 35-36 (discussing waste,
diversion, and use preferences regarding surface waters).
42 Id. at 42.
43 Id. at 34.
44 See generally id. at 38-39 (discussing sales and transfer procedures pertaining to
water rights).
45 See generallyid. at 32 (noting that water rights are prioritized in accordance with the
date of their initiation, and that they may be enjoined if water standards are not maintained).
46 Id. at 37-39.
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data) and distributed among those users by priority, and 3) all appropriators are using water in accordance with the terms of their rights and with
reasonable efficiency. However, to the extent that these conditions are not
fully met, then current practices may deviate from the law. Where water
rights are somehow in question, good data are lacking on basin hydrology
or actual water use, or there is inadequate water use regulation, then existing uses may differ dramatically from users' legal rights. Depending
upon the circumstances, some users will be better off with the status quo,
while others will benefit if water is used and managed "by the book."
Second, while the Northwest states usually preserve the status quo at
the expense of water law principles, there are exceptions. The results are
not entirely consistent largely because state governments are not monolithic. State water-resource agencies, citizen commissions and boards, legislatures, governors, trial courts, and appellate courts all have jurisdiction
over water matters. Often, one state government entity has sought to preserve an established water use by changing or not applying the law, while
another entity of the same state government has tried to uphold the law.
For example, the governors of both Oregon and Washington have vetoed
recent legislative efforts to revise state law in favor of status quo water
uses. 47 When the Idaho Department of Water Resources refused to curtail
groundwater use to protect senior appropriators, the state supreme court
held that the agency had a mandatory duty to regulate. In Washington,
when the Department of Ecology took this same action, the state supreme
court held that the agency had no authority to do so.48 Given these common divisions within a state government, it is somewhat imprecise to
speak of "state" efforts to protect established water uses, and defenders of
49
the status quo do not always have the last word.
Having stated these caveats, this Article examines the recent actions
and practices of Northwest states with respect to established water uses.
The record shows that the states commonly pursue an informal, unofficial
47 See infra notes 94, 96, 123 and accompanying text.
48 When the Idaho Department of Water Resources refused to curtail established groundwater uses in order to protect senior appropriators, the state supreme court ordered the
agency to regulate water use in accordance with legal priorities. Musser v. Higginson, 871
P.2d 809 (Idaho 1994) (court ordered state agency to curtail pumping by junior groundwater
users as needed to protect senior surface water users). Conversely, after the Washington
Department of Ecology acted to protect senior water users by limiting junior irrigators'
groundwater withdrawals, the state court issued a divided opinion striking down the
agency's action. Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993) (holding
that state agency could not curtail pumping by junior groundwater users unless there had
been an adjudication).
49 On the other hand, while efforts to protect the status quo do not always succeed in the
courts or the legislatures, the threat of judicial or legislative action may have a chilling effect
on state agency actions. An agency may be reluctant to curtail established water uses if it
knows it is likely to be confronted by a local elected official, whether a judge or a state
legislator. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. If a state agency is concerned about
such an outcome, or if it has insufficient staff or data to regulate water use adequately, it
may simply defer action. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. Thus, established
water uses may continue unabated despite official state law and policy, albeit less securely
than if they were protected by statute or court order.
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policy of protecting the water use status quo even when it conflicts with
traditional water law principles. 50 This status quo policy, like prior appropriation, has a few fundamental rules. Unlike the basic features of prior
appropriation, however, these rules are difficult to locate in any treatise or
casebook on western water law. Instead, they must be synthesized from
state efforts to protect existing uses. With rare exceptions, states abide by
the following basic precepts: 1) enforce the law only when necessary, 5 1 2)
change the law where needed to protect existing uses, 52 3) avoid the position of having to curtail established water uses, 53 and 4) prevent instream
demands from threatening existing out-of-stream uses. 54 This section discusses these basic tenets of the status quo policy and examines how states
have implemented them.
A. Enforce the Law Only When Necessary
In deciding whether to curtail ongoing water uses, the water resource
agencies in the Northwest states take a passive approach. If "enforcement" is defined as requiring water users to comply with applicable laws
and water right conditions, 55 such as duty or place of use, all four states
take enforcement action against water users almost exclusively in response to complaints from other users. 56 Montana's official policy is that a
"complaint is always required unless the regional manager can document
compelling reasons for recommending enforcement without one."57 Even
when disputes arise between groups of existing users, the agencies can be
reluctant to step in. 58
50 See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 55-94 and accompanying text.

52 See infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 153-75 and accompanying text.

55 For purposes of this Article, enforcement generally means something more aggressive
than simply shutting off junior water users in times of shortage to meet a "call" by senior
users from the same water source. States routinely regulate by priority in this manner. It is
far less common for states to enforce water right limitations such as rate, duty or place of
use, or to shut off junior groundwater pumpers whose use may be affecting senior users of

surface water. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
56 Telephone Interviews with: Tom Paul, Deputy Administrator, Field and Technical Services Division, Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD) (Mar. 24, 1997); Tim Luke,
Manager, Water Distribution Section, Idaho Water Resources Department (IWRD) (Mar. 24,
1997); Jack Stults, Regional Offices Supervisor, Montana Department of Natural Resources

and Conservation (DNRC) (Mar. 26, 1997); and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, Enforcement Coordinator, Shorelands and Water Resources Program, Washington Department of Ecology (Mar. 31,
1997).
57 WATER RIcHTs BUREAU, MONTANA DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES & CONSERVATION, CONFLICT RESOLUIrON AND ENFORCEMENT AciONS UNDER THE WATER USE ACT 2 (1994) (on file

with author).
58 After more than twenty years of complaints from senior water users and an extensive
hydrologic study, in 1990 the Washington Department of Ecology (Ecology) finally issued a
cease and desist order against junior irrigators in the Sinking Creek area. See Rettkowski v.
Department of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 234-35 (Wash. 1993). The Washington Supreme Court,
however, ruled that Ecology lacked statutory authority to take that action, because the basin
had not yet been adjudicated. Id. at 236-40. In 1993, the Idaho Department of Water Re-
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In Whatcom County, Washington, the state Department of Ecology
(Ecology) has taken little action against widespread illegal water use, despite a 1993 survey 59 that found over five hundred users taking water without a valid right.60 Most of these users were irrigators, and many had been
using water illegally for decades, without a valid state permit, decreed
right, or precode claim. 6 1 Despite this clear violation of state law, Ecology
took no meaningful enforcement action against the Whatcom County
users. 62 Washington Governor Gary Locke vetoed a bill approved by the
1997 Washington legislature that would have granted amnesty to the
Whatcom County users.63 Locke did, however, sign a bill that allowed
these users to file water right claims that they had already relinquished
under state law, effectively authorizing the uses to continue.6
It is impossible to ascertain the true extent of noncompliance with
water laws and water rights in the Northwest, largely because the state
water resource agencies do not actively seek out violators. 65 A perception
exists that violations are common, and that enforcement is infrequent or
ineffective. For example, the Snake River Salmon Recovery Team stated
"[tlhe dewatering of salmon breeding and rearing habitat must be eliminated.... The monitoring of screen use, screen performance, and the
quantity of water diverted must be greatly improved."6 6 But most of the
sources refused surface irrigators' repeated demands to regulate pumping by junior groundwater users on the Snake plain aquifer, arguing that such regulation must await a formal
hydrologic determination on conjunctive management of ground and surface waters in that
area. See Musser v. Higginson, 871 P.2d 809, 810-11 (Idaho 1994). The Idaho Supreme Court,
however, ruled that the Department had a clear legal duty to act. Id. at 812.
59 In the early 1990s, the Ecology briefly pursued a program of investigating water uses
based on an active enforcement strategy, rather than on complaints. "In our recent enforcement history, there were a couple of years when we actually had resources for enforcement," said an Ecology official. Interview with Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, supra note 56.
60 Ecology is unsure of how many users might be taking water illegally in Whatcom
County. Estimates have ranged from 500 to 2000. Id.
61 Telephone interview with Lloyd Moody, Executive Fellow, Office of Washington Governor Gary Locke (Feb. 21, 1997).
62 Id. According to one Ecology official, "we enforced against them in the sense of asking their voluntary compliance to stop using water illegally." Interview with Linda PilkeyJarvis, supra note 56. Ecology could not tell whether voluntary compliance was occurring,
however, because the agency no longer had the enforcement resources to check on water
use in Whatcom County. Id.
63 The bill would have authorized continued water use by those who had beneficially
used water for irrigation, stock watering, or domestic purposes before January 1, 1993. H.R.
1111, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997) (vetoed May 20, 1997).
64 See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
65 Karen A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of
Restoring Streamflows, 27 ENVTL. L. 151, 201 (1997).
66 SNAKE RIVER SALMON

RECOVERY TEAM, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE NATIONAL

MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE V-11 (May 1994). The Northwest Power Planning Council's 1994
Fish and Wildlife Program urges the Northwest states to "[i]mprove enforcement of existing
water rights and duties for diversions and use from the mainstreams of the Columbia and
Snake Rivers and tributaries." NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, DRA-r ANADROMOUS
FISH AMENDMENTS TO THE 1994 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 7-50
(1994).
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information is anecdotal, and there has been no systematic study of water
law violations and enforcement.
Recent events in the Wallowa River Basin of northeast Oregon illustrate the problems of ascertaining noncompliance. An anonymous writer
claiming to work for the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife sent a
series of letters to state officials and a Portland television station alleging
widespread and serious water right violations in the Wallowa Basin. The
letters claimed that data obtained from state sources showed actual diversions often far exceeding legal limits. 67 The Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD) responded that these allegations were based on
mistaken assumptions about the limits of Wallowa Basin water rights, and
denied that there was significant illegal use in the area. 68 Department officials acknowledged, however, that they had very limited enforcement staff
in the Wallowa Basin since the basin's watermaster position had been discontinued in the 1980s. 69 Given this lack of staff, the Department itself
70
may not know whether all water users are in compliance.
The environmental group WaterWatch approached state officials in
1996 with concerns about excessive water diversions in the Wood River
Basin of southern Oregon, but the Water Resources Department essentially denied that illegal diversions were occurring. 71 WaterWatch then employed a hydrologist who used a flow meter to take measurements of
Wood River diversions. The hydrologist reported back to the state that
there did appear to be serious illegal water use in that basin.72 State officials continued to dispute the WaterWatch findings, but acknowledged
that "the concerns raised by WaterWatch have some merit. We believe, as
does WaterWatch, that the lack of adjustable headgates in some cases, or
lack of easily read measuring devices in other cases, can result in excessive diversions."7 3 Shortly thereafter, the agency ordered Wood River irri74
gators to install adequate headgates.
67 Two of these letters compared "water right amounts" for various diversions against
flow meter data showing actual diversion amounts on unspecified dates. Anonymous letters
to: John Kitzhaber, Governor of Oregon (Feb. 4, 1995); and Town Hall, KATU Channel 2,
(Mar. 14, 1995) (on file with author).
68 Telephone interview with Kent Searles, Regional Manager, OWRD, Baker City, Oregon
(May 23, 1995); letter from Martha 0. Pagel, Oregon Water Resources Director, to Jeff Curtis,
Executive Director, WaterWatch of Oregon (Dec. 13, 1995) (on file with author). Searles
stated that the old Wallowa River Decree did not specify any maximum rate for irrigation
diversions, contrary to the anonymous writer's unstated assumption.
69 Telephone Interview with Kent Searles, supra note 68. Searles noted that the Water
Resources Department had declined repeatedly to re-establish the Wallowa watermaster's
position. The Department recently proposed to restore the position, but that proposal was
not included in the Governor's proposed budget for 1997. Telephone interview with Tom
Paul, supra note 56.
70 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
71 Telephone interview with Jeff Curtis, WaterWatch Executive Director (Mar. 20, 1997).
72 Id.

73 Memorandum from Bob Main, OWRD Regional Manager, Bend, Oregon, to Martha Pagel, OWRD Director (Oct. 9, 1996) (on file with author).
74 Letter from Bob Main, OWRD Regional Manager, Bend, to Jeff Curtis, WaterWatch
Executive Director (Dec. 3, 1996) (on file with author). Attached to this letter were undated
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Oregon law actually authorizes the Water Resources Department to
allow illegal water uses to continue temporarily. Specifically, the Water
Resources Director may issue a "limited license," a sort of revocable temporary water right, 75 in connection with an enforcement order to address
an illegal water use. 76 Essentially, the law authorizes the director to condone an otherwise illegal water use, provided the director 77orders the user
to comply with the law within a specified period of time.
The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(DNRC) has an unofficial policy of deferring to informal arrangements
(such as water-right pooling or rotation agreements) among local water
users on a stream, even when those arrangements are "extralegal."' 78
79
DNRC staff believe that such arrangements are common in Montana.
DNRC not only tolerates these "extralegal" arrangements, but actually supports them, primarily because DNRC believes they are usually well tailored to the hydrologic conditions of the watershed, and local water users
80
like them.
None of the Northwest states have taken strong action to implement
the requirement of beneficial use without waste. 8 ' As one commentator
recently concluded:
The law in Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington requires that water not be
wasted... [but] there has been no meaningful enforcement of this requirement
in any of the states. In all four states, the failure to enforce appears to be because the states lack 1) information on actual water use, 2) a clear waste definition, and 3) political support or wherewithal for anti-waste enforcement. The
consequences of this failure include injury to other legal water right holders,
both instream and out-of-stream, as well as harm to the public's rights as the
8 2
owners of the water resource.
copies of notices to six water users, requiring them to install headgates on their diversions
from Sevenmile Creek and the Wood River.
75 OR. REV. STAT. § 537.143 (1997).
76 Id. § 537.143(4). The director may take this step only if she finds that the user did not
knowingly violate the law, that "immediate termination of the illegal use would cause serious and undue hardship" to the user, and that "(tihe continued use under a limited license
outweighs the public benefits of termination, including deterrence of illegal uses and protection of the water source." Id. This final provision is somewhat confounding: what about the
continued use must outweigh "the public benefits of termination"? The private benefits of
using the water? The benefit to the agency of avoiding confrontation with an illegal water
user?
77 Id. § 537.143(4)-(5).
78 Telephone interview with Jack Stults, supra note 56. Pooling or rotation agreements
provide for the sharing of water rights by several users from a particular water source. Such
agreements may allow some appropriators, especially those with junior rights, to use water
when they otherwise could not.
79 Id.
80 Id. DNRC also may like these arrangements because they allocate water among users
without the need for state agency intervention. See infra notes 143-152 and accompanying
text.
81 See Russell, supra note 65, at 151.
82 Id. at 201.
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When the Northwest states have made limited efforts to encourage efficient water use, they have been very deferential to current water uses and
83
practices.
None of the four state water resource agencies in the Northwest believes it has adequate resources to do its job.8 4 When asked by agency
headquarters for an estimate of additional staffing needs, one OWRD field
manager responded as follows:
You asked for a "Cadillac" and a "Citron" [sic] version of what staffing additions are needed to regulate to rate and duty on all Snake River tributaries....
Our needs estimate is more of what you might call a "Chevy" or "Dodge" version, like the earlier Grande Ronde proposal. This "Chevy" version is believed
to allow us to regulate to rate and duty in two years. We think that this is
reasonable and justifiable. The minimum needs estimate is just that, a mini-

mum. This staffing level will not get us to rate and duty, but is hoped to be
sufficient to let us identify problem areas. Not much more than [the
85
watermaster's] description of our current program, "a one speed bicycle."
Despite increasing pressures on water resources in the 1990s, none of the
state legislatures have provided any significant increases in agency en86
forcement resources.
The states are not the only water managers in the Northwest with a
poor record of enforcing legal requirements; the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau), too, has been passive in ensuring compliance with federal
laws and contracts. The Bureau has known for well over a decade of widespread misuse, or unauthorized use, of water from federal reclamation
projects.8 7 This "water spreading" arose in part because the Bureau had
consistently failed to ensure that project water was being delivered in accordance with legal and contractual requirements.8 8 In 1994, the Bureau
83 As stated by Russell,
In general, the four Columbia Basin states only look at water use efficiency when they
review applications for new uses of water or participate in basin adjudications. However, the states have not attempted to change the proposed method of diversion, conveyance, and application of water through these standards.... [Sitates continue to
view waste as the amount of flow diverted in excess of reasonable needs using customary irrigation practices rather than using the most efficient irrigation practices.
Id. at 158 (citations omitted).
84 The enforcement program managers of the four state water resource agencies, when
asked individually if their agency had enough enforcement resources to its job, all answered
"no." Telephone Interviews with Tom Paul, Tim Luke, Jack Stults, and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis,
supra note 56.
85 Memorandum from Kent Searles, OWRD Regional Manager, Baker City, Oregon, to
John Borden, OWRD, Salem, Oregon (June 12, 1992) (on file with author). Searles said that
no additional resources had been allocated in response to his request. Telephone Interview
with Kent Searles, OWRD Regional Manager (Mar. 26, 1997).
86 In Idaho, Montana, and Oregon, enforcement resources have been roughly stable over
the 1990s, while in Washington, they have decreased. Telephone Interviews with Tom Paul,
Tim Luke, Jack Stults and Linda Pilkey-Jarvis, supra note 56.
87 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, IRRIGATION OF INELIGIBLE
LANDS, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION

88 Id. at 4-5.

4-6 (Audit Report No. 94-1-930, July 1994).

MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

1998]

promised that it would act to resolve water spreading, 9 but soon its officials were assuring project irrigators that it had taken the wrong approach.90 Shortly thereafter, the Bureau quietly abandoned the issue over
the protests of environmentalists. 91
The agencies' failure to enforce is somewhat understandable, in part

because any efforts they make to curtail existing water uses may be vitiated by the legislatures or courts. Consider the experience of OWRD in its
attempts to regulate certain groundwater users whose pumping affected
surface flows in the Umatilla River.9 2 Two water users filed suit, and the
district court for Umatilla County blocked the Department from regulating
them in conjunction with surface water.9 3 In addition, the 1995 Oregon
legislature approved a bill intended to block such regulation, although the
94
governor vetoed it.
B. Change the Law Where Needed to Protect Existing Uses
Central to the status quo policy is the notion that existing laws are
generally less important than existing water uses.9 5 As explained in the
following paragraphs, the Northwest states in the 1990s enacted numerous
revisions to their water laws that help preserve established water uses. In
addition, the 1997 Washington legislature approved several bills that
would have significantly altered state water law in favor of status quo
96
water uses, although Governor Locke vetoed all or part of ten such bills.
97
The Idaho Supreme Court's 1994 decision of Musser v. Higginson
created something of a crisis in the state. Under prior appropriation law,
the Musser case was hardly revolutionary; the court unanimously held
89 Reed D. Benson & Kimberley J. Priestley, Making a Wrong Thing Right: Ending the
"Spread"ofReclamation ProjectWater, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 89, 103-04 (1994), reprintedin
WATER LAW TRENDS, POUCIES AND PRACTICE 269, 273 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D.
Crammond eds., 1995).

90 Cole: Curbing Water-Spreading Won't Boost Stream Fows for Fish, EAST OREGONIAN,
Sept. 28, 1995, at A3.
91 Letter from American Rivers, Idaho Rivers United, Natural Resources Defense Council, and WaterWatch, to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior (July 18, 1995) (on file with
author). In Oregon, however, the Bureau is making some efforts to resolve long-standing
problems of unauthorized water use, particularly those concerning the Umatilla Project.
JOHN W. KEYS III, STATEMENT TO THE WATER & POWER RESOURCES SUBCOMM., HOUSE RESOURCES Comm. (Oct. 4, 1995) (on file with author).
92 See, e.g., Letter from David Williams, OWRD, to Kris McCullough, water user (Mar. 31,
1994) (on file with author).
93 Snow v. State of Oregon, No. CV-95-0537 (Umatilla Cty. Cir. Ct., June 13, 1995) (temporary restraining -order) (on file with author).
94 Letter from John Kitzhaber, Governor of Oregon, to Phil Keisling, Secretary of State
(July 21, 1995) (vetoing H.R. 3091, 68th Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 1995)) (on file with author).
95 See infra notes 97-136 and accompanying text.
96 Veto letters from Gary Locke, Governor of Washington, to the Washington House
Speaker and members (May 14, 1997) (vetoing H.R. 1729, 1730), (May 20, 1997) (vetoing H.R.
1111, 1118, 1272, 2050, 2054); veto letters from Gary Locke, Governor of Washington, to the
Washington Senate President and members (May 14, 1997) (vetoing S.5276), (May 20, 1997)
(vetoing S.5030, 5783, 5079) (on file with author).
97 871 P.2d 809 (Idaho 1994).
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that the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) had a clear legal
duty to distribute water in accordance with rights of prior appropriation.9 8
Musser threatened a serious upset of the status quo because it called on
the state to curtail groundwater use from the Snake plain aquifer in favor
of senior surface water appropriators.9 9 Consequently, IDWR quickly
adopted conjunctive use rules '0 0 that, while giving a nod toward prior appropriation, authorized (continued) "reasonable use" of both surface and
groundwater resources.' 0 ' Thus, after the Idaho Supreme Court forced a
reluctant IDWR to curtail junior groundwater users, IDWR established

more "reasonable" rules, that is, rules more favorable to junior pumpers

02
than the traditional tenets of prior appropriation.'
The Idaho Legislature has also acted repeatedly to legitimize existing,
otherwise illegal irrigation uses through the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). The legislature protected water users who had irrigated an
excessive number of acres, or who had changed their place of use without
the necessary state approval.'0 3 Idaho enacted statutes in 1985 and 1989,
attempting to grant such illegal uses a presumption of validity, 10 4 but the
meaning of these laws was exceptionally opaque,' 0 5 and the court in In re
SRBA declared them unconstitutionally vague in 1994.106 Within weeks,

98 Id. at 812.
99 Laird J. Lucas, Conjunctive Management of Surface and Groundwater in Idaho: A Conservationist Perspective, Paper Presented at 1995 Water Policy Conference, Northwestern
School of Law of Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Oregon, at 1-3 (May 19-20, 1995).
100 Rules Governing Conjunctive Management of Surface and Groundwater, 94-10 IDAHO
ADMIN. BULL. 436 (Oct. 5, 1994).
101 The rules "acknowledge all elements of the prior appropriation doctrine as established
by Idaho Law." Id. Rule 20.02 at 440. But the following section, headed "Reasonable Use of
Surface and Groundwater," states:
These rules integrate the administration and use of surface and groundwater in a
manner consistent with the traditional policy of reasonable use of both surface and
groundwater. The policy of reasonable use includes the concepts of priority in time
and superiority in right being subject to conditions of reasonable use as the legislature may by law prescribe as provided in Article XV, Section 5, Idaho Constitution,
optimum development of water resources in the public interest prescribed in Article
XV, Section 7, Idaho Constitution, and full economic development as defined by Idaho
law. An appropriator is not entitled to command the entirety of large volumes of
water in a surface or groundwater source to supporthis appropriation contrary to the
public policy of reasonable use as described in this rule.
Id. Rule 20.03.
102 By subjecting appropriative rights to a test of reasonableness, Idaho water law took a
big step in the direction of riparianism, which provides that all owners of riparian property
may use a river's water, provided the use is reasonable. See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra
note 27, at 32.
103 IDAHO COoE §§ 42-1416(2), 42-1416A (repealed 1994).
104 Id.

105 See Phillip J. Rassier, Idaho AdjudicationPresumptionStatutes, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 507
(1992).
106 In re SRBA, Case No. 39576 (Twin Falls Cty., 5th Dist. Idaho, Feb. 4, 1994) (memorandum decision and order on basin-wide issue number 1). The Idaho Supreme Court would
later observe that the "presumption" statute, IDAHO CODE § 42-1416(2) (repealed 1994), "was
an attempt to provide 'amnesty' for illegal expansions." Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. &
Mitigation Group v. Idaho Groundwater Appropriators, Inc., 926 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Idaho
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the Idaho legislature passed new statutes that clarified and strengthened
protection for otherwise illegal uses in the SRBA. The legislature declared
that the public interest was served by confirming past expansions and
transfers of water rights that had been made out of compliance with state
law.' 0 7 The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the new statutes as
constitutional.' 0
Montana and Washington also changed state statutes to resurrect certain forfeited water rights. Montana law originally prescribed a deadline of
June 30, 1983 to file claims of existing rights in the statewide general adjudication. 10 9 Users filed a mind-boggling 216,000 claims," 0 and the adjudication rumbled forward. Nevertheless, in 1993 the Montana legislature
authorized the filing of "late claims," essentially granting amnesty to those
who had lost their rights by failing to file ten years earlier."' Washington
took the same action three times, enacting statutes in 1979,112 1985," 3 and
1997114 to allow the filing of precode water right claims, even though state
law had provided that such claims were conclusively deemed waived and
relinquished if not filed by 1974.115 Both states thus reinstated old water
6
rights that had already been forfeited by operation of law."
1996). According to the supreme court, the "accomplished transfer" statute, IDAHO CODE
§ 42-1416A (repealed 1994), "permitted users who had undertaken transfers of water rights
without compliance with the statutory provisions of I.C. § 42-222 to have the transfer confirmed in the course of the general SRBA adjudication." Id.
107 IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1425, 42-1426 (1994). Section 1426 legitimized past expansions of
the volume of water used, but did not allow increases in the rate of diversion, or reductions
in the "quantity of water available to other water rights existing on the date of the enlargement in use." Id. § 42-1426. Section 1425 allowed approval of past transfers, provided they
did not enlarge the right or injure other existing water rights. Id. § 42-1425.
108 The court found that these statutes adequately protected the rights of junior appropriators, partly because they provided for subordination of water rights if a junior would otherwise be injured. Fremont-MadisonIrrigationDist., 926 P.2d at 1307.
109 MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-221(1) (1997).
110 DAR CRAMMOND, COUNTING RAINDROPS: PROSPECTS FOR NORTHWESTERN WATER RIGHT ADJUDICATIONs 31 (1996) (completed for the Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College).
111 "'Late claim' means a claim to an existing right forfeited pursuant to the conclusive
presumption of abandonment under 85-2-226." MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(11) (1997). In
authorizing the filing of late claims, the statute stated, "[s]ubject to certain terms and conditions, the legislature intends to provide for the remission of the forfeiture of existing rights
to the use of water caused by the failure to comply" with the original filing deadline. Id. § 852-221(3).
112 1979 Wash. Laws 216; see Dave Mastin, Fairnessis the Goal when Approaching Water
Rights Issues, CAPITAL PRESS, Sept. 26, 1997, at 11 (noting that the Legislature had reopened
the filing period in 1979).
113 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.14.043-044 (1.996) (allowing late claims to be filed during a fiveweek period in 1985 if authorized by the Pollution Control Hearings Board).
114 H.R. 1118, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1-3 (Wash. 1997) (allowing late claims to be filed
during a ten-month period beginning September 1, 1997).
115 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.14.041, 90.14.071 (1996). The revived precode claims predate
June 7, 1917 (surface water) or June 7, 1945 (groundwater). H.R. 1118, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 1 (Wash. 1997).
116 The Washington legislator who sponsored the 1997 bill argued that the legislation was
necessary to protect innocent water users against "unfair" state laws. By terminating the
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The Oregon legislature acted specifically to preserve existing water
use by the Grants Pass Irrigation District, and to save the district's embattled Savage Rapids Dam. 1 17 Savage Rapids is an aging diversion dam on
the Rogue River that poses a serious barrier to salmon passage, and also
diverts water at a far greater rate than the district needs to irrigate its
acreage."l 8 Oregon officials found that the district's diversions exceeded
its water rights, and refused to issue a new right allowing the practice to
continue." 9 After years of conflict, the district struck a deal with the Oregon Water Resources Commission and dam opponents: the district would
receive a temporary water right, allowing continued diversions at a somewhat excessive rate, while the district had to begin taking steps to remove
the dam and replace it with pumps. 120 The Commission issued a permit on
the basis of that agreement in 1994.121 But the following year, the Oregon
legislature approved two bills in an effort to save Savage Rapids Dam. The
first would have legislatively issued the district a new water right with no
conditions regarding dam removal. 122 Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber
vetoed that bill, chiefly on the grounds that the legislature should not issue
water rights. 123 The second bill blocked dam removal temporarily while a
new task force, established by the bill, studied the matter. 124 Kitzhaber
water rights of those users who failed to meet filing requirements in 1969, 1979, and 1985, he
wrote the following:
The government made thieves of those who had the strongest, oldest claims in
the state-if they are indeed thieves.
Now we come to 1997. This year, the Legislature acknowledged (in a bill I sponsored) that the brief permit refiling periods in 1979 and 1985 were unfair to those who
were "outside the loop of government." We voted to reopen the permit process for 10
months ....
[W]e are not providing "amnesty" to so-called "water thieves".
In fact, we
are allowing a small group of people to continue to use water as they have for most of
this century.
Mastin, supra note 112, at 11.
117 Historical information regarding the Savage Rapids Dam is briefly stated in a memorandum from Martha Pagel, Oregon Water Resources Director, to the Oregon Water Resources Commission, and titled Informational Report and Proposed Review Schedule on
GPID Submittal of Plan to Meet Permit Conditions (Apr. 8, 1994) (on file with author).
118 Id. attachment 1, at 1-2.
119 Id.

120
121
122
123

Id.
Id.
S. 1005, 68th Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 1995).
The Governor's veto message stated the following:

The Oregon water rights system is based on the doctrine of prior appropriation, a
doctrine that has governed the development of water throughout the West. While I
have serious concerns about the ability of this system to assure necessary instream
flows for future generations, I have not advocated changes that would disrupt the
fundamental concepts governing our water management system. SB 1005 would do
just that by suggesting to the public that the legislature is the proper forum for establishing water rights, rather than the system that has been in place for nearly a century.
Letter from John Kitzhaber, Governor or Oregon, to Phil Keisling, Secretary of State (July 21,
1995) (on file with author).
124 1995 Or. Laws 586.
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signed that bill into law, effectively derailing the water right/dam removal
1 25
agreement.
The Oregon legislature first authorized "amnesty" for water users in
1989, establishing a process whereby irrigation districts could legitimize
otherwise illegal changes in their water use, subject to certain conditions. 126 By the end of 1995, Oregon had created several more exceptions
to the appurtenancy requirement, 127 particularly for irrigation districts.
Among other things, Oregon established a streamlined process for the
transfer of water rights within, irrigation districts, including water rights
already subject to forfeiture for five successive years of nonuse.' 28 A 1995
statute allowed districts to obtain a certificate of water right for irrigation
of lands not covered by the underlying permit. 129 The legislature did, how30
ever, preserve the "no injury" test for all these changes.'
C. Avoid the Position of Having to Curtail Uses
Agencies, courts, and legislatures have recognized that they can often
preserve the status quo quite effectively by limiting state involvement in
water rights controversies. 13 ' This approach not only allows existing uses
to continue, but also saves agency resources and reduces state entanglement in potentially nasty matters. Limiting state involvement may not be
good public policy,' 3 2 but it often makes sense in both bureaucratic and
political terms by keeping agencies and elected officials from taking unpopular stands against established water uses.
The Washington Supreme Court's 1993 Sinking Creek decision,
Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology,'3 3 severely constrained Ecology's
authority to administer water rights. In the Sinking Creek case, Ecology
125 Id. A majority of the task force authorized by that statute voted in 1996 to retain the
dam. See Cindy Long, Dam Decision: Let's Keep It, GRANTrS PAss DAILY COURIER, Oct. 10,
1996, at Al.
126 The process was given the name of "district water rights mapping." OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 541.327-333 (1997). Districts could change the place and purpose of use of their water
rights, provided the changes did not expand those rights or injure other users. Id.
127 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
128 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 540.572-540.580

(1997).

129 Id. § 537.252. Some Oregon irrigators argued that they already had the right to irrigate
lands not listed in the permit, based on state law and prior agency practice, but their lawsuit
on that issue was dismissed on procedural grounds. Teel Irrigation Dist. v. Water Resources
Dep't of the State of Oregon, 919 P.2d 1172 (Or. 1996).
130' OR. REV. STAT. §§ 541.331, 540.578, 537.252(1)(d)

(1997).

131 Charles F. Wilkinson, Implementing Wise Water Policy in Washington State, 11 lILAHEE 24, 27 (1995).
132 Id. Criticizing the Sinking Creek decision, see infra notes 133-35 and accompanying
text, Wilkinson stated:
I find it hard to imagine how, in this complicated age, you can deal with water and not
have a modem water management agency. Yet the Sinking Creek decision leaves
Washington State in exactly that position. Even without a sweeping overhaul of legislation, some interim or permanent regulatory power must be given to the Department
of Ecology so that it can get on with the necessary business of regulating water use.
Wilkinson, supra note 131, at 27.
133858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993).
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had stepped in (after about twenty years) to regulate junior groundwater
irrigators in favor of senior surface-water ranchers. A majority of the
Washington court, however, held that Ecology had no statutory authority
to regulate water use until a general stream adjudication had been conducted in the basin. 134 Two justices entered a persuasive dissent on legal,
practical, and policy grounds. Among the points made by the dissent:
The majority correctly points out that its decision will not provide for a "cheap
and easy" water adjudication solution. Prohibitively expensive and interminable litigation is what the majority has fashioned as a solution, and to no purpose. The relief sought by neither party was for a general adjudication, and yet
that is now the only relief which the majority opines is available. The director
of Ecology, upon reading the majority opinion, will surely scratch her head in
wonderment that she has the responsibility135
for issuance of water use permits
but no authority to regulate those permits.
In the years since the Sinking Creek decision, the Washington legislature
has done nothing to restore Ecology's regulatory authority over water
use. 136 Thus, for the majority of Washington river basins not yet adjudicated, the state exercises no significant control over existing water uses.
Idaho is currently undergoing its own "expensive and interminable
litigation" to adjudicate the water rights of the Snake River Basin, which
covers nearly the entire state.' 3 7 A 1996 decision of the SRBA court, however, raised profound questions about whether the adjudication would actually scrutinize current water use in any meaningful way, or simply
134 Id. at 240.

Id. at 242 (Guy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent continued:
Interpreting Ecology's power to regulate water rights as encompassing adjudicated
water rights solely is bad policy. At the present time, only a small fraction of Washington's waters have been adjudicated. For example, the Acquavella litigation involves a
general adjudication of water rights in the Yakima River. This litigation began in 1977,
involves thousands of parties, and has twice appeared before this court. The general
adjudication process continues. Its complexity and longevity demonstrate why it is
bad policy to limit Ecology's regulatory powers to adjudicated water rights. Doing so
leaves the great majority of the state's waters outside of Ecology's regulatory authority until there is a general adjudication as to those waters.
Id. (citations omitted).
136 Telephone Interview with Lloyd Moody, supra note 61. Rather than expand or clarify
Ecology's authority over water, the Washington legislature in the 1990s has chosen to emphasize planning and decisionmaking at the local watershed level. The 1997 Legislature approved two bills to increase local control over water resource decisions. H.R. 1272, 55th
Leg., Reg.'Sess (Wash. 1997) (increasing local involvement in water right transfers); H.R.
2054, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997) (providing for locally-controlled water resource
planning). Washington Governor Gary Locke vetoed portions of both bills. Letters from Gary
Locke, Governor of Washington, to the Washington House Speaker and members (May 20,
1997) (explaining veto of specified sections of H.R. 1272 and H.R. 2054) (on file with author).
Washington's earlier efforts toward greater local involvement in watershed planning are discussed in Reed D. Benson, A Watershed Issue: The Role of Streamflow Protectionin Northwest River Basin Management, 26 ENvTL. L. 175, 185, 215-18 (1996).
137 By February 1996, over 174,000 claims had been filed in the SRBA. CRAMMOND, supra
note 110, at A-6 to A-9.
135
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confirm "paper rights."' 38 SRBA-Judge Hurlbutt ruled that Idaho statutes
did not allow for "partial forfeiture" of water rights.139 In other words,
forfeiture of a water right for nonuse would be an all-or-nothing proposition; unless completely forfeited, water rights would not shrink after obtaining their maximum size. The Idaho Supreme Court overturned this
decision, holding that Idaho law does provide for partial forfeiture. 140 Had
Judge Hurlbutt's ruling stood, it would have resulted in SRBA decrees for
water rights considerably in excess of current uses. 14' At the very least, it
would have reduced agency and court involvement in major disputes over
forfeiture, which would not have become an issue unless a right had been
42
entirely unused for several years.'

In Montana's massive statewide adjudication, DNRC has scaled back
its efforts to evaluate and oppose water use claims. The agency is less
active and aggressive than it used to be, largely due to pressure from the
water court itself.' 43 Such a policy may in fact speed up the adjudication,
which has long been an interest in Montana, 14 but it also protects existing
users who generally have the most to lose from a thorough evaluation of
their water rights. As one commentator has stated:
Water right adjudications promise secure rights, finality, and better management of water resources. But uncertainty and ineffectual state control favor
the status quo ante users, most of whom are also in a position to control the
pace of adjudications through litigation and the effectiveness of adjudications
through state legislatures. Claimants in control of large blocks of water have
only lukewarm enthusiasm for decrees and stridently challenge any decision or
order that diminishes their claimed rights. Every set of water users faces the
possibility that a final decree and better administration may limit or interfere
145
with their accustomed water use.
138 Janis E. Carpenter, Water for Growing Communities: Refining Traditionin the Pacific Northwest, 27 ENvTL. L. 127, 138 (1997).
139 In re SRBA, Case No. 39576 (Twin Falls County., 5th Dist. Idaho Apr. 26,1996) (memorandum decision on basin-wide issue 10).
140 Idaho v. Hagerman Water Rights Owners, 947 P.2d 400 (Idaho 1997).
141 By authorizing water rights in excess of recent water use, the Hurlbutt ruling would
have allowed appropriators to expand their water use beyond current levels, thereby reducing the amount of water available to existing junior users. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court
ruling actually protected the status quo.
142 In a somewhat similar development, the Washington Supreme Court recently reversed
a Yaldma County Superior Court ruling which had awarded a water right to an irrigation
district for more water than the district had ever actually used. Department of Ecology v.
Acquavella, 935 P.2d 595 (Wash. 1997). The supreme court ruled that the district's water
right must be based on actual evidence of beneficial use, rather than on- how much the
district could have diverted through its irrigation system in a full season. Here again, had the
trial court ruling stood, it might have threatened the status quo by allowing an expansion of
current water use.
143 CRAMMOND, supra note 110, at D-4, D-7; telephone interview with Stan Bradshaw, Helena water attorney (Feb. 6, 1997). Crammond also noted that the agency seeks to work out
its differences informally with claimants before filing its report on a water use claim. CRMMOND, supra note 110, at 34.
144 Id. at D-3, D-4, D-8.
145 Id. at 25.
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The State of Oregon, as a policy matter, has chosen not to regulate
water use in the Klamath Basin until the Klamath adjudication is complete. 146 At the same time, Oregon has essentially taken the position that
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which owns and mmages the Klamath
reclamation project, may not deliver water for any purpose but irrigation
until the adjudication is complete. 147 According to the state, the Bureau
lacks authority to deliver water for fish, tribal needs, or wildlife refuges in
the Klamath Basin, because the project's water rights are exclusively for
irrigation.14 8 Thus, the state claimed that it had the sole authority to allocate water and regulate its use, but declined to exercise that authority.
Oregon's stance may be legally suspect, 149 but it is politically and bureaucratically expedient. The state's position is at once pro-existing user and
anti-federal government, and while asserting state authority, it actually
limits state involvement.
Some observers believe that watershed councils and other locally
driven, consensus-based efforts have gained popularity in the Northwest
largely because they can help guard the status quo. 150 Whatever their potential benefits for resource protection and restoration, local consensus
efforts seem likely to protect existing water uses, limit state involvement,
and reduce controversy on contentious issues.' 5 ' The trend toward local
empowerment runs counter to traditional western water law, however, in
that it tends to "localize" a resource that is legally controlled by the state
and owned by the public.152
146 Letter from Stephen E.A. Sanders, Oregon Assistant Attorney General, to Martha Pagel, Oregon Water Resources Director (Mar. 18, 1996) (on file with author). The letter does
not explain the legal or policy rationale for Oregon's decision.
147 Id. at 7-11.
148 Id.
149 The U.S. Department of Interior responded that it does indeed have both the authority
and the responsibility to manage the project in accordance with the federal environmental
laws and the senior water rights of Indian Tribes in the Klamath Basin. Memorandum from
David Nawi, Pacific Southwest Region Interior Solicitor, and Lynn Peterson, Pacific Northwest Region Interior Solicitor, to various Department of Interior officials (Jan. 9, 1997) (on
file with author).
150 See Russ Lehman, Abdicating Responsibilityfor the Holy Grail of Consensus, 11 IL,
LAHEE 18 (1995). Lehman argued that "[t]hose groups that have historically fought to keep
the status quo-those whom antiquated laws and policies have served very well-will be the
first to argue for consensus approaches when political power is held by those they consider
a threat to business as usual." Id. at 21. See also Benson, supra note 136, at 195-97.
151 See Benson, supra note 136, at 194-99.
152 Consider the following section of a Washington statute, enacted in 1997, which provides for locally developed water resource plans:
The legislature finds that the local development of watershed plans for managing
water resources and for protecting existing water rights is vital to both state and local
interests. The local development of these plans serves vital local interests by placing
it in the hands of people: Who have the greatest knowledge of both the resources and
the aspirations of those who live and work in the watershed; and who have the greatest stake in the proper, long-term management of the resources. The development of
such plans serves the state's vital interests by ensuring that the state's water resources are used wisely, by protecting existing water rights, by protecting instream
flows for fish, and by providing for the economic well-being of the state's citizenry
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D. Prevent Instream Demands from Threatening Existing Uses
Water users often voice support for instream flows, but user groups
typically do not want to see streamflows protected and restored at their
expense. Thus, the status quo policy moves states to ensure that instream
flow demands do not threaten existing uses, either through some specialized legal approach or under the traditional rules.
This aspect of the status quo policy is perhaps best illustrated by the
basic character of state instream flow programs in the Northwest. The
laws of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington all essentially limit the establishment of minimum protected streamflows to state agencies, 153 while Montana's law is just slightly less restrictive.15 4 These arrangements effectively
allow politically powerful user groups, with their influence in state govern55
ment, to maintain considerable control over instrearn flow protections. 1
These programs also relegate instream rights to second-class status in a
system that one commentator has deemed "socialist":
Barriers still stand... to the full integration of instream uses into state
water allocation systems. Barriers (such as the "second class" treatment of instream flows...) are not due to any natural incompatibility between instream
rights and the prior appropriation doctrine. Far from it; the doctrine is fully up
to the task of accommodating modem needs. All that remains is to eliminate
those legislative restrictions which are essentially alien to the doctrine's
nature.
The most pervasive and frustrating limitation on instream water rights in
most western states is the prohibition against ownership of instream rights by
persons other than a designated state entity. This prohibition is a curious twist
on the prior appropriation doctrine. It reflects a basic discomfort with the concept of instream rights and an underlying distrust of those entities which may
seek to acquire them, particularly environmental groups and the federal
government....
and communities. Therefore, the legislature believes it necessary for units of local
government throughout the. state to engage in the orderly development of these watershed plans.
H.R. 2054, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 102 (Wash. 1997). While this section names four "state"
interests, at least two,. protecting existing water rights, and securing the economic wellbeing of citizens and communities, could just as easily be characterized as private or local
interests. Thus, Washington has significantly shifted its water policy toward local decisionmaking on the basis of local interests and away from traditional state control over public
water resources.
153 IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1501, 42-1503 (1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.336 (1997); WASH. REV.
CODE

§§ 90.03.247, 90.22.010 (1992).

154 Montana allows state agencies, federal agencies, and political subdivisions of the state
to apply for instream flow reservations in six specific basins. MoTrr. CODE ANN.

§

85-2-316(1)

(1997).
155 See generally James D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rightsfor Instream Flow Uses: A
Survey of Water Transfer Policy, Practices, and Problems in the Pacific Northwest, 26
ENv-L. L. 225, 240 (1996) (discussing private arrangements regarding instream rights); Jack
Sterne, Instream Rights and Invisible Hands:Prospectsfor PrivateInstream Water Rights
in the Northwest, 27 ENv-L. L. 203, 217-19 (1997) (discussing obstacles to enforcing, and the
bureaucracy involved in securing, instream rights).
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Ironically, then, the drafters of such programs have turned away from the
market-based principles which underlie the prior appropriation system, and
have embraced principles of command-and-control resource allocation-so156
cialism, if you will-with respect to instream rights.
Conceptual problems aside, the Northwest states' instream flow programs face many practical obstacles. These programs must overcome procedural burdens, inadequate enforcement, minimal funding, and political
pressure in order to protect streamflows in any meaningful way. 157 These
limitations undoubtedly reflect existing users' discomfort with instream
flow rights, even where those rights would be later in time and thus lower
8
in priority. 15
Washington Governor John Locke vetoed portions of a bill passed by
the 1997 Washington Legislature that would have largely transferred instream flow protections into local hands. 159 The bill would have established local "planning units," with multiple votes for local governments
and water users, but only one vote for the Washington state government. 160 These planning units would have had the authority not only to
determine future instream flows, but to "adjust" streamflow protections
already established by the state. 16 But for the Locke veto, all of Washington's existing minimum flows could have been eliminated, watershed by
watershed, by vote of local governments, water users, and property own-

156 Christopher H. Meyer, Instream FMows: IntegratingNew Uses and New PlayersInto
the PriorAppropriationSystem, in INSTREAM FLOw PROTECTION IN THE WEST 2-1, 2-13 (Law-

rence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., 1993).
157 Sterne, supra note 155, at 216-19.
158 Id. at 222-26.

159 H.R. 2054, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997). Part I of the bill provides for water
resource plans developed at the local (watershed) level. Locke signed sections 101 to 106,
which provided generally for local planning on water resources, but vetoed sections 107 to
116, which specified the composition of local planning units, the elements of water resource
plans, the effect of the plans, and other matters. Letter from Gary Locke, Governor of the
State of Washington, to the Washington House Speaker and Members (May 20, 1997) (on file
with author).
160 The size of these planning units would have varied depending upon several factors,
including the number of counties within the watershed. For each county, there would have
been 1) a representative of the county, 2) a representative of cities within that county, and 3)
a representative of water supply utilities within that county. There also would have been one
representative of all conservation districts within the watershed, and one member representing the "general citizenry" appointed by the cities of the watershed. In addition, the planning
units would have included nine representatives of "various special interest groups" appointed by the cities and counties, and three members representing the "general citizenry"
appointed by the counties, but of these three, at least two must have been water right holders or claimants. In watersheds containing an Indian reservation, the tribe also would have
had a seat. Finally, three state agencies, Transportation, Fish and Wildlife, and Ecology, all
would have been members, but with only one vote among them. H.R. 2054, 55th Leg., Reg.
Sess. §§ 107-08 (Wash. 1997) (vetoed May 20, 1997).
161 Id. § 110(2)(c). Ecology would have had to approve these plans with very limited authority to demand changes. Id. § 112.
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ers. 162 The vetoed legislation would have shifted to the local level a large
measure of the state's traditional control over a public resource, although
the legislation would not have allowed local planning units to "adjust" existing out-of-stream water rights.
Private transactions to convert existing water rights to instream use,
whether permanently or temporarily, could provide some senior water for
flow restoration. 163 Each of the Northwest states makes some provision
for such transactions, while maintaining significant limitations164 The
1995 Montana legislature authorized a time-limited program allowing temporary transfers of water for instream flow use; 165 a cautious step, certainly, but still a step in the direction of expanding options for flow
protection. In Oregon, by contrast, bills were introduced in the 1995 and
1997 legislative sessions to prohibit any transfer of water from irrigation
to any other use. 166 The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation supported changing
Idaho law to allow the transfer of natural flow water rights for instream
purposes, but it could not even get the bill introduced in the 1997 Idaho
67
legislature.1
Environmentalists sometimes suggest eliminating wasteful water use
as a promising method for restoring depleted streamflows. 168 The Washington Supreme Court recognized that possibility in State Department of
Ecology v. Grimes,169 but seemed to foreclose it. In Grimes, the court
reviewed a referee's report that seemed to consider environmental factors
in evaluating the Grimes' claims in a water rights adjudication. The court
noted that, while considering environmental impacts is consistent with
certain state obligations under the water laws, "these factors cannot operate to impair existing water rights." 170 In fact, the court specifically rejected the use of a "reasonable efficiency" test for reviewing existing
162 Except for the state agency representatives, each member of the planning units would
have had to be "a resident and a property owner of the [basin] for at least three years." Id.
§ 107(4), 108(1)(c).
163 See generally Sterne, supra note 155, at 219-26.
164 Id. at 24043, 256-59.
165 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-407 to 85-2-408 (1998).
166 H.R. 2628, 69th Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 1997); H.R. 3100, 68th Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 1995). H.R.
3100 passed the House in 1995 despite opposition from environmentalists, urban water interests, and even some in the agricultural community. Farmers' Water Rights Bill Passes
House, EAST OREGONIAN, May 17, 1995, at Al.
167 Telephone interview with Rich Rigby, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Boise, Idaho (Mar.
26, 1997).
168 See, e.g., Russell, supra note 65, at 153.
169 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993).
170 Id. at 1053. The court determined that consideration of aquatic impacts was consistent
with WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005, § 90.054.010(1)(a), and § 90.054.101(2), but could not impair existing rights. The court also noted, however, that other laws may "operate to define
existing rights in light of environmental values," and cited WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005 and
§ 90.03.010, thus seemingly contradicting itself as to the applicability of § 90.03.005 to existing rights. Id. Section 90.03.005 calls for the State Department of Ecology to reduce wasteful practices to the maximum extent possible, and establishes state policy of "obtaining
maximum net benefits arising from both diversionary uses of the state's public waters and
the retention of waters within stream and lakes in sufficient quantity and quality to protect
instream and natural values and rights." WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005 (1998).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
water rights, saying it was

adjudication.

171

inappropriate

[Vol. 28.:881
in the

context of an

The Idaho Supreme Court similarly rejected the application of the
172
public trust doctrine in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA).
The court confirmed that water rights in Idaho are held subject to the
public trust, which can take precedence over vested water rights. 1 73 But
according to the court, the public trust was not an element of a water
right, and therefore not an issue to be determined in the SRBA.' 74 The
Idaho legislature acted quickly to address a perceived threat to established
water uses by passing a statute in 1996 that purports to preclude applica175
tion of the public trust doctrine to water rights.

III.

EFFECTS OF THE STATUS Quo POLICY

The basic rules of western water law work to the benefit of some
groups of people and the detriment of others.' 7 6 Whatever else might be
said about them, the traditional rules at least give all interest groups a
clear sense of what to expect-if the rules were in fact applied. Senior
users would have a reliable water supply, but would be limited to the
terms and conditions of their water rights.'7 7 Junior users' diversions
would be curtailed, if needed, to satisfy senior rights, but senior rights
could not be changed or expanded to the juniors' detriment. 178 Instream
flows would have very late priorities, but they would nonetheless be protected to that extent. They would benefit over time as rules, such as waste
and abandonment, were applied against consumptive rights.' 79 Prospective new users would be unable to obtain a new water right from a fully
appropriated source. However, they would have an opportunity to acquire
171 Grimes, 852 P.2d at 1053-54.
172 Idaho Conservation League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995). A long line of court
cases establishes that certain resources are held by state governments in trust for the public.
The public trust doctrine essentially dictates that a state must protect the public interest in
these resources; the state cannot completely give them away. Thus, the doctrine checks the
power of state government to transfer ownership and control of certain public resources
into private hands. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d
709 (Cal. 1983).
173 Idaho Conservation League, 911 P.2d at 750.
174 Id. The court withdrew its original opinion in Idaho Conservation League, which
questioned whether the public trust doctrine was even "a valid element of Idaho Law" despite earlier Idaho Supreme Court cases adopting the doctrine. Idaho Conservation League,
Inc. v. Idaho, S. Ct. No. 21144, 94.14 ISCR 694, 696 (Idaho June 8, 1994), withdrawn, 911
P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995).
175 IDAHO CODE § 58-1203(2) (1997). Experts on the public trust doctrine have seriously
questioned the legality of this Idaho statute. Michael C. Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public
Thust Doctrine:An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461
(1997).
176 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 259-74 (1992) (discussing disparate benefits and impacts of water use under prior appropriation).
177 See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
179 See generally Meyer, supra note 156, at 2-4 (discussing the administration of priorities
among instream flow water rights).
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an existing right and change its use, perhaps transferring the water to a
new type of consumptive use or even instream use.18 0 But under the status
quo policy, the results are often quite different from these expectations.
A. Winners and Losers Change
When compared to what would happen if the traditional water law
rules were applied, if a state preserves the water use status quo, it often
helps one class of existing water users to the detriment of another. A legislature, court, or agency may understand that it is helping one interest at
another's expense, but in some instances may not realize that it is effectively redistributing water from one group to another.
Many decisions essentially have involved a choice among irrigators:
surface water users versus groundwater users, juniors versus seniors. Between these classes, the winners have not been consistent, but the states
have consistently preserved the status quo. In other words, the states have
chosen to allow water users to continue their established practices, rather
than apply the traditional rules of prior appropriation in a manner that
would change those practices. The Oregon and Idaho legislatures effectively chose seniors over juniors (who would have benefited from the enforcement of water laws and water rights) when they offered a sort of
amnesty to many existing water uses.' 81 On the other hand, the Idaho Department of Water Resources's conjunctive use rules, issued in response
to the Musser decision, effectively favored junior users who pumped
groundwater over seniors using surface water.' 8 2 The Washington
Supreme Court maintained the status quo, thereby helping junior irrigators
at the expense of seniors, when it took a narrow view of the Department
of Ecology's authority in the Sinking Creek case.' 8 3 In these latter two
instances, both seniors and juniors had long used water with little state
involvement. The seniors would have benefited from curtailment of the
juniors' pumping in times of shortage, but the Idaho rules and the Sinking
Creek decision created obstacles to state regulatory action.
The Sinking Creek decision illustrates how the status quo policy can
harm even senior water users who have tried to defend their rights. The
Sinking Creek ranchers held senior rights to.surface water, and, although
they began complaining to Ecology in the mid-1960s that they were being
180 This last statement assumes that an evenhanded application of the traditional rules of
western water law would allow water rights to be freely transferable for any purpose, including instream flow, which often is not the case. Id. at 2-13.
181 See supra notes 103-08, 126-30 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. These rules helped protect the status
quo because the junior users were accustomed to pumping groundwater without regard to
their possible effect on surface water flows, or on the senior irrigators who used those
flows. The Musser decision, applying traditional prior appropriation rules, ordered the Idaho
Department of Water Resources to curtail pumping to satisfy senior users, thereby disrupting the juniors' established use of groundwater. The conjunctive use rules, however,
favored the juniors and the status quo by imposing a "reasonableness" test on senior appropriators' water use. Therefore the rules provided an element of legal protection to the juniors' continued pumping. Musser v. Higginson, 871 P.2d 809 (Idaho 1994).
183See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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harmed by junior irrigators' groundwater withdrawals, the agency took no
action until 1989.184 When the agency did take action, the junior pumpers
sued to block regulation, and the Supreme Court ultimately held that Ecology lacked statutory authority to act. 18 5 Thus, as the Sinking Creek dissenters noted, 186 the seniors were left with no good options to settle their
long-running dispute. The dissenters openly urged the Washington legislature to fill the management void created by the majority opinion, 8 7 but so
88
far the legislature has not done so.'
Protection of established water uses may also harm prospective new
users. By refusing to apply laws that would reduce the quantity of water
legally held by existing users, states limit the amount of water potentially
available for new appropriations. For example, Montana and Washington
could have freed up some water for new uses by applying their forfeiture
laws against users who had failed to submit timely claims, but the states
chose instead to protect the status quo by allowing the filing of late
claims. 189 Even though improving efficiency could provide water for new
uses, none of the Northwestern states has taken serious action against
90
waste. 1
States also may disadvantage prospective new uses by restricting
transfers of existing water rights. For example, Montana prohibits the
transfer of large water rights unless the applicant can prove that several
conditions are satisfied.' 9 ' Oregon constrains interbasin water transfers to
protect the basin of origin. 192 Idaho law prohibits changing the purpose of
use of agricultural rights if the change "would significantly affect the agricultural base of the local area."19 3 Bills introduced in the past two sessions
of the Oregon legislature would prohibit any water transfers from irriga94
tion to any other use.'
184
185
186
187
188

Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 234 (Wash. 1993).
Id. at 236-38.
Id. at 242 (Guy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 245.
The 1997 Legislature did note that "the lack of certainty regarding water rights within
a water resource basin may impede management and planning for water resources." H.R.
2054, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 301 (Wash. 1997). But rather than restore Ecology's authority to
regulate water prior to the completion of a general adjudication, the legislature merely directed Ecology to "give high priority" to an adjudication request submitted by a local basin
planning group. Id.
189 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text. The 1997 Washington statute specifies
that any new late claims "shall not affect or impair in any respect whatsoever any water
right existing prior to the effective date" of the act, but they still may disadvantage prospective new users. H.R. 1118, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(1) (Wash. 1997).
190 See Russell, supra note 65, at 153-54.
191These conditions relate to effects on other water users, the water source, and the
environment. MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(4) (1997). If the proposed transfer involves a right
that consumes at least 4000 acre-feet annually and 5.5 cubic feet per second (cfs), it must be
approved by both the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation and the legislature. Id. § 85-2-402(5).
192 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.801-537.809 (1997).
193 IDAHO CODE § 42-222 (1995).
194See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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Instream uses probably suffer most under the status quo policy. Like
prospective new consumptive uses, instream flows generally lose out
when states refuse to require existing uses to comply with established
laws and water right conditions. 195 Flow restoration efforts are also undermined by laws and attitudes restricting water right transfers and leases
for instream use.' 9 6 For example, Idaho law precludes transfer of consumptive water rights for instream use, even though the state water plan
calls for that prohibition to be changed.19 7 Moreover, states sometimes
disarm instream flow advocates by preventing them from employing certain legal tools. For example, the Idaho legislature effectively shut conservation groups out of the Snake River Basin Adjudication.198 Similarly, the
Washington Supreme Court in Grimes held that consideration of environmental values could not "operate to impair existing water rights." 199
Even in a crisis atmosphere arising from the prospects of salmon run
extinction and increased federal regulation, the Northwestern states seem
unlikely to take strong enforcement action against existing users in order
to protect streamflows. A recent "crisis" in Oregon arose from the proposed listing of two stocks of coho salmon under the federal Endangered
20
Species Act.200 State political leaders pushed hard against a listing, ' urg195 This may be especially true where states refuse to curtail groundwater withdrawals
despite their evident effects on surface water, as Idaho did for many years. See Steve
Stuebner, No More Ignoring the Obvious: Idaho Sucks Itself Dry, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb.
20, 1995, at 1, 8-11 (noting environmental and other impacts of Idaho's failure to enforce
prior appropriation against groundwater users in the Big Lost River Basin).
196 As stated recently in an annual synopsis of water transaction activity throughout the
West, "[e]xperiments in Oregon and Washington to acquire water for fish and wildlife habitat
have raised the possibility of water sales-but political and social acceptance of transferring
water out of agricultural communities are slowing development." 1996 Annual Tansaction
Review: Markets Evolving to Include Public Trust Purposes, WATER STRATEGIST; Winter
1997, at 3, 17. See CRAMMOND, supra note 110, at 247.
197 As the plan states:
In some instances, it is in the public interest to allow changes from traditional uses to
instream flow purposes. In highly developed areas, the potential to protect or restore
fish and wildlife, water quality, aesthetic, or recreation resources may depend upon
the transferability of water rights. To make such transfers substantive, the priority
date of the original water right should be retained if other water rights are not injured.
Chapter 15, Title 42, Idaho code needs to be expanded to enable the Idaho Water
Resource Board to apply for a change in the nature of use when a water right is
acquired that is best used for minimum or instream flow purposes.
IDAHO WATER PLAN, supra note 6, at 5.
198 The 1994 Legislature eliminated the requirement that transfers adjudicated in the
SRBA comply with the "local public interest" which, combined with the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision on the public trust, effectively blocked environmental groups from participating in the SRBA. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho
1995).
199 State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Wash. 1993). Grimes is somewhat ambiguous on the question of how environmental values may relate to existing water
rights.
200 Threatened Fish and Wildlife, Enumeration of Threatened Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,029
(July 25, 1995).
201 Ed Merriman, Gov. Works to Sell Salmon Plan in D.C., THE CAPITAL PRESS, Feb. 7,
1997, at 3.
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ing the federal government to defer to Oregon's own plan, the Oregon
Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative. 202 The state initiative contained
several measures relating to water quantity and instream flows, addressing
new instream and consumptive water rights, enforcement of existing
rights and laws, increased water use efficiency, and other matters. 20 3 Oregon's plan did not commit the state to taking aggressive measures on existing uses. For example, the initiative stopped short of requiring water
users to measure and report their withdrawals, promising only that the
state would consider it. 20 4 The initiative called for four additional Water
Resources Department field employees, but did not commit the Department to taking controversial enforcement actions such as limiting water
users to their annual duty or regulating groundwater in conjunction with
surface water.20 5 The state agreed to convene "collaborative" local groups
to develop water use efficiency standards, but was vague as to whether it
would establish standards in the absence of local consensus, or how it
20 6
would use them in any event.
Continued protection of existing user groups will likely prevent
meaningful progress toward restoring streamflows in most of the Northwest. The water use status quo means seriously depleted (even nonexistent) flows in many rivers and streams. New or recently established
streamflow protections, at best, will merely prevent the situation from getting worse. Water right acquisitions for instream flows and public funding
for water conservation offer win-win solutions that seem likely to work far
better in theory than in practice, given the massive amounts of money
required to restore flows in even one river. 20 7 Economic and environmental costs will also limit new storage projects and other "structural solu202 STATE OF OREGON, OREGON COASTAL SALMON RESTORATION INITIATIVE

(Legislative Re-

view Draft, Feb. 24, 1997) (on file with author).
203 Id. ch. 3, at 1-13.
at 28-29 (Measure 22).

204 Id.

205 Id. at 21-22 (Measure 10).
206 Id. at 24-25 (Measure 14).
207 The high price of restoring flows through water conservation measures or water right
acquisitions is illustrated by a 1994 federal statute pertaining to Washington's Yakima Basin,
and two recent cost estimates relating to Oregon's Deschutes River. The Yakima River Basin
Water Enhancement Project Act authorized federal funding of water conservation measures
with the goal of saving at least 110,000 acre-feet annually for instrean flows within eight
years. Pub. L. No. 103-434, § 1201(4), 108 Stat. 4550 (1994). For these purposes, the bill authorized $5 million to plan and study conservation measures and $67.5 million to implement
them. Id. § 1203(j), 108 Stat. at 4555. The bill also authorized up to $10 million for water
right leases and acquisitions from willing sellers. Id. §§ 1203(i)(3), 12030)(4), 108 Stat. at
4555.
The federal government proposed a voluntary approach to restoring flows in the upper
Deschutes River, a federally designated wild and scenic river, by funding half the cost of
irrigation districts' water conservation projects, and obtaining half of the salvaged water for
instream use. Id. § 1203(d)(1), 108 Stat. at 4553. To implement this strategy, the total capital
cost alone was estimated to exceed $64 million. U.S. FOREST SERV., UPPER DESCHUTES WILD
AND SCENIC RIVER, RECORD OF DECISION AND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 288,

tbls. 4-10 (1996). The Environmental Defense Fund estimated that a 30-year lease of 250 cfs
for instream flows in the middle Deschutes would cost $21 million. DEBORAH MOORE ET AL.,
RESTORING OREGON'S DESCHUTES RIVER 83 (1995).
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tions" to flow restoration. 20 8 Cooperative local efforts based on
consensus, for all their promise and recent popularity, offer little hope of
addressing instream flow problems effectively. 20 9 The conclusion is unpleasant but inescapable: protecting the water use status quo means accepting the continued dewatering of Northwest rivers and streams for the
foreseeable future.
In general, existing water users in the Northwest have been remarkably successful at continuing their established practices even where these
practices violate venerable principles of western water law, and even
though applying that law would often benefit other interests. The reason
for existing users' influence in maintaining the status quo is open to debate, but public choice theory2 10 offers an interesting insight. One branch
of public choice theory suggests that groups representing narrow economic interests are often remarkably effective in securing favorable results from public bodies.21 ' Research on interest groups' influence in
Congress shows that a group is most likely to succeed when the group 1)
is attempting to block, rather than obtain legislation; 2) has goals that are
narrow, with little public visibility; 3) is supported by other groups and
public officials; and 4) can shift the issue to a favorable forum, such as a
friendly congressional committee. 21 2 This research suggests some of the
reasons why existing users often win; they seek to preserve the status quo
(although they sometimes have done so by having legislation passed,
rather than blocking it), they have limited goals in low-visibility issues,
they typically have strong support from their legislators and other political
figures, and they often have favorable venues in legislative water commit3
tees and local courts, if not in the state agencies themselves .21
B. Economic Questions Persist
The state and federal governments commonly justify the protection of
the water use status quo on economic grounds. Thus, Idaho offered "amnesty" to otherwise vulnerable uses in the Snake River Basin Adjudication
to protect "significant investments by water users and tax base for local
governments." 214 Similarly, the U.S. Department of the Interior has been
208 See Hal Bernton, County Swims Upstream to Build a New Dam, THE OREGONIAN, Feb.
21, 1997, at Al, A16 (describing opposition to a new dam on a tributary of the Umpqua River,
despite proponents' claims that the project would benefit fish by releasing cool water during
the summer).
209 This issue is explored extensively in Benson, supra note 136, at 201-06.
210 Public choice theory essentially applies economic methods to the study of public policy decision making. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands:
Why "Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 415 (1994); DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRCiKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1 (1991).
211 FARBER & FRiCKEY, supra note 210, at 17-21.
212 Id. at 19.
213 Michael Blumm has stated that these same factors help explain why industry groups

retain disproportionate control over public lands decisions of the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Forest Service. Blumm, supra note 210, at 420-21.
214 See Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. & Mitigation Group v. Idaho Groundwater Appropriators, 926 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Idaho 1996).
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reluctant to attack subsidies or even unauthorized water uses, because
users have come to depend on them. 2 15 The rationale appears to be that
individual livelihoods and local communities have come to rely on existing
water use arrangements and it would be unfair or unduly costly to disrupt
them, regardless of the problems they pose.
Certainly there are some people who have come to depend (directly
and indirectly) on existing water uses, and their lives would be disrupted
if those uses were discontinued. In other contexts, however, this rationale
is not enough to justify continued violation of the law, or especially continued expenditure of public funds. The Umatilla Tribes have noted the
disparity in treatment between illegal tribal fishing and illegal irrigation:
"When Indians fish illegally, we are sent to federal prison. When irrigators
kill fish by illegally taking water, they are not punished. Instead, we are
told by the United States Government that we must consider the impacts
2 16
to the irrigation economy of making them stop their illegal activity."
Military bases, too, have closed despite their economic importance to local communities. The fairness of protecting existing uses based on eco217
nomic reliance is arguable, depending on one's point of view.
Even from a purely economic 9tandpoint, the status quo policy seems
unsound in many cases. On one hand, existing water uses certainly provide economic benefits to their users, their local communities, and the
Northwest states. User groups and their allies emphasize these benefits in
defending the status quo. 218 On the other hand, existing uses impose various kinds of costs on society, both by causing harm to valued resources
(such as dewatering salmon habitat or degrading water quality) 2 19 and by
preventing water from being used for other purposes (such as hydropower
generation, new businesses, or instream flows). 220 A comprehensive and
215

Bureau official Frank Gunner raised concerns over the economic impacts of terminat-

ing unauthorized water uses on Oregon's Umatilla Project, saying it "would have a big effect
on an awful lot of people." Richard Cockle, Hermiston-Area Irrigation Threat Imperils
Jobs, THE OREGONIAN (2d ed. 1993), Oct. 20, 1993, at C08, available in 1993 WL 11700089.

The Department of Interior has defended continued subsidies to reclamation project irrigators because those subsidies are "responsible for much of the current character of the western United States." Letter from Wayne Merchant, Assistant Secretary for Water & Science, to
Congressman George Miller III (D-Cal.) (Feb. 1988) (quoted in PALMER, supra note 21, at 64).
216 CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION, WATER SPREADING POLICY

1 (1994), reprinted in Water Use Practices on Bureau of Reclamation Projects, Oversight
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Natural Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1994).
217 See PALMER, supra note 21, at 135-39 (noting a variety of viewpoints regarding irrigation in the western United States).
218 In the Umatilla Basin of eastern Oregon, for example, irrigators claimed in 1993 that
unless Bureau of Reclamation water continued flowing to around 15,000 unauthorized acres,
over 2000 jobs would be lost, with a total economic impact of over $90 million in two rural
counties. See Cockle, supra note 215, at COS.
219 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CONTROLLING WATER USE: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WATER

QUALITY PROTECTION 7 (Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law

ed., 1991).
220 David M. Gillilan, Will There Be Water for the National Forests?, 69 U. CoLo. L. REV.

533, 561-63 (1998).
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accurate look at the costs and benefits of water uses may show that many
2 21
current uses are far from optimal.
Critics of the status quo point to a variety of natural resource
problems associated with current water uses. 222 Such problems carry economic costs, although these costs are hard to quantify because of difficulties in valuing ecosystem services and other benefits of resources "in
place."223 Clear identification and valuation of such costs and benefits
221 A National Research Council report on groundwater valuation, in assessing water uses
in the Treasure Valley region of eastern Oregon and southwestern Idaho, recognized that
current water use patterns are not ideal:
The interplay of surface water use, groundwater quality, and, ultimately, stream flow,
creates challenges for public water resource managers as they try to achieve multiple
objectives.... A plan that achieved optimal use across all water resources in the
basin would likely vary dramatically from the use pattern typically observed in such
settings. Assessment of the values from one type of water resource, such as groundwater, in isolation will lead to suboptimal resource use.
COMMITTEE ON VALUING GROUNDWATER, VALUING GROUNDWATER: ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND AP-

125 (1997) (prepublication copy) (on file with author).
222 A 1994 report by the majority staff of the House Natural Resources Conunittee sum-

PROACHES

marizes this point:
The use of water for irrigation substantially expands the productive capacity of agricultural lands in the arid West, but it also has substantial natural resource impacts.
These impacts vary from project to project, but often include:
" damage to fisheries and recreation on depleted streams;
" destruction of anadromous fish stocks, warm water fisheries and whitewater recreation due to the construction of dams;
" loss of sediment as silt settles out of reservoirs;
" fish mortality from unscreened diversions;
• reduction of groundwater tables, leading to well closures and ground subsidence;
* pollution of water and wetlands with pesticides, fertilizers, salts and trace metals
from irrigation tail water and drain water; and
* salt build-up in irrigated soils.
TAKING FROM THE TAXPAYER: PUBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES COMM., MAJORITY STAFF

REPORT 43 (1994) (on file with author).
223 In announcing a new study on determining the value of groundwater, the National
Research Council noted the difficulty of the task:
Groundwater is used for more than half of the nation's supply of drinking water and
substantial amounts are allocated for agricultural and industrial purposes. It also
plays a crucial but often overlooked role in sustaining wetlands and other ecosystems. Yet it is undervalued because no widely accepted means exist to measure its
inherent benefits to society....
A fundamental step in valuing groundwater is recognizing and quantifying its
worth both when extracted from the ground and when left in place-its "total economic value," as defined by the committee. This approach entails recognizing not only
its obvious purposes, such as for irrigation and drinking water, but also its less apparent but important role in supporting ecosystems. Subsurface water maintains stream
flows and replenishes wetlands and lakes. These, in turn, preserve threatened or endangered species and support drinking and irrigation supplies. Groundwater provides
a "derived" value through its contributions to the larger environment.
National Research Council, New Framework Proposed for Determining Value of Groundwater, Publication Announcement (Apr. 2, 1997) (on file with author) (announcing publica-

tion

of COMMITTEE ON VALUING GROUNDWATER: ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES,-

note 221 (unavailable to the public as of this writing)).

supra
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would force the Northwest to reassess the economic worth of many current water uses. The public value of some uses may be far lower than
commonly believed. 224 Even economically beneficial uses, for example,
irrigation of high-value crops in Idaho, may prove suboptimal at the margin, because society might benefit if some portion of the water used for
225
irrigation went to other purposes instead.
Critics also maintain that, compared with alternative water uses, ex226
Irriisting uses often generate little economic return per unit of water.
gation of alfalfa and other forage crops is most easily questioned, because
these crops have relatively low values and high water demands. 227 The
marginal value of irrigation water in the West is commonly estimated to be
less than fifty dollars per acre-foot. 228 Meanwhile, municipal water suppli224 Consider the following statements regarding the value at the margin of irrigation
water in the Rio Grande Basin:
[Published data] indicate that, at the margin, the value of water used for irrigation is
no greater than zero [in the Middle Rio Grande area]. That is, increasing the supply of
water for the lowest-value irrigated crop, pasture, does not yield an increase in output
that is more valuable than the costs of capital, labor, and other factors of
production....
This conclusion is not unique to the Middle Rio Grande Valley....
Another factor reinforces the conclusion that the marginal value of water used
for irrigation is zero. Most irrigators in the [Rio Grande] Basin use water made available through extensive federal expenditures on dams, channel maintenance, and
other items. The irrigators do not incur the full costs of obtaining, storing, and delivering water to their fields and, hence, the federal expenditures, in effect, subsidize use
of the water.
ERNIE NIEMI & TOM McGucIGN, WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY: UPPER Rio GRANDE BASIN, REPORT
TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION 57 (1997) (on file with author).

225 Tim Palmer also makes essentially this point:
Irrigation with Snake River water created a productive agricultural economy. Nobody
says it's necessary to alter the society held tightly by people who benefit from livelihoods based on irrigation. What people do say is that the system of water and resource use that has made the irrigation society possible should be reconsidered in
light of what has been lost, and should be regarded with a new concern for the future
of the river, the fish, the wildlife, the recreation, the environmental vitality, and the
people of Idaho.
PALMER, supra note 21, at 138.
226 See generally Daniel F. Luecke, The Role of Markets in the Allocation of Water Among
Agricultural and Urban Users in the Western United States 3-6 (Dec. 11, 1992) (discussing
the relationship between water availability and regional growth) (paper presented at the
University of Barcelona, Spain) (on file with author).
227 Of all irrigated lands in the West, around 30% grow alfalfa and other forage, while
approximately 40% grow cereal grains. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT, ACREAGE

LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION

RULES AND REGULATIONS 3-34 (1996).

228 As one author noted:
Empirical estimates of the direct marginal value productivity of irrigation water in the
western United States usually fall in the range of $25 to $75 per acre-foot .... For the
majority of crops the estimates are in the lower part of this range. Some even fail to
reach the lower bound.... In the intermountain states the value of water in irrigation
can be as low as $10 per acre-foot....
Luecke, supra note 226, at 6. NIEMI & McGucKIN, supra note 224, concluded that the marginal value of irrigation water in parts of the Rio Grande Basin is no greater than zero.
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ers have been willing to pay upwards of $2000 per acre-foot in recent
transactions. across the West.2 29 In some places, the highest economic use
of water may be instream. 2 30 From a purely economic point of view, perpetuating lower valued water uses is not efficient. As one commentator
has stated, "[a]lthough individual users, whether in cities or in rural areas,
are probably efficient from their point of view, at the system level the vast
differences in the relative value of water and often neglected instream values suggest that inefficiencies abound." 23' Facilitating transfers from current uses to new uses of higher value, including instream uses, could
232
produce real economic and environmental benefits.
Here again, public choice theory recognizes that special interest
groups may obtain outcomes that are not economically efficient from society's point of view. 233 As scholars point out, this is not necessarily a bad
result, because economic analysis is an imperfect tool for evaluating public policy23--questions of fairness and other issues must also be considered. But if the status quo policy produces economically inefficient
results, decision makers should openly and clearly explain why protecting
235
existing users is in society's best interests.
229 Transaction Update, WATER STRATEGIST, Winter 1997, at 11-15; Bonnie G. Colby, Water
Reallocation and Valuation: Voluntary and Involuntary Transfers in the Western United
States, in WATER LAW TRENDS, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 112, 116-19 (Kathleen Marion Carr &
James D. Crammond eds., 1995).
230 As one researcher has stated:

Using a variety of valuation methods, the economic value of water for environmental
uses can be estimated and compared with the value of water for offstream uses. In
some instances, the benefits generated by keeping an acre-foot of water in a stream,
lake, or wetland is greater than the marginal value of that water for agriculture and
other competing offstream uses.
Colby, supra note 229, at 119 (citation omitted). Instream flow benefits include improved
water quality and enhanced recreational opportunities, as well as "nonuse" values such as
preserving unique ecosystems and specied habitat. Id. See NIEMI & McGUCKiN, supra note
224, at 61-67; Luecke, supra note 226, at 7-10.
231 Luecke, supra note 226, at 12-13.
232 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER TRANSFERS: MORE EFFICIENT WATER USE

POS-

SIBLE, IF PROBLEMS ARE ADDRESSED 19-24 (May 1994).
233 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 210, at 34.
234 As stated by Farber and Frickey:
When economists describe special interest legislation as "rent-seeking," they mean
that the legislation is not justified on a cost-benefit basis: it costs the public more than
it benefits the special interest, so society as a whole is worse off. We agree that, all
other things being equal, this is undesirable. But all other things are not always
equal.... Cost-benefit analysis cannot be the only standard for evaluating government
decisions. For technical reasons, cost-benefit analysis-or more specifically, the underlying standard of economic efficiency-cannot be applied until a prior decision is
made about how to distribute social entitlements.
Id. (citation omitted).
235 Farber and Frickey summarize as follows:
[Tihe fact that interest groups obtain rent-seeking legislation does not necessarily
mean that interest group politics is [sic] undesirable. Realistically, however, we must
concede that at least some of the resulting legislation may be hard to justify based on
anybody's view of social justice. As a society, we are made poorer by such legislation
with no countervailing moral benefit.
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One interesting aspect of the status quo policy is that it sometimes
contradicts that commonly stated maxim: "water flows uphill toward
money."236 While that maxim seems likely to hold true over the long run,
the current trend is to preserve existing uses. One commentator has observed that recent attempts to block out-of-stream or basin transfers
amount to "quasi-riparianism."23 7 Money can sometimes make water move
uphill, but existing users often can stop water from moving anywhere.
Thus, existing water users may be even more influential than money.
IV.

CONCLUSION-IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATUS QUO POLICY

Despite the pressures of population growth, environmental restoration, and economic transformation, established water uses have remained
solidly protected in the Northwest. In order to perpetuate current uses,
state legislatures, courts, and agencies alike have refused to apply, and
sometimes have even changed, legal requirements. The record clearly
shows that the states have been extremely reluctant to implement the
traditional rules of western water law if doing so would mean upsetting
the water use status quo. Today, those traditional rules are often honored
in the breach; if they ever were sacred, certainly they are not any longer.
In managing water resources, the Northwest states rarely deviate
from the status-quo policy. Like it or not, anyone with a stake in the resource should recognize that the states generally will do what they must in
order to protect existing water uses. Legal rules, agency mission statements, and even the interests of other water users usually are not enough
to force action that would threaten established uses. Given this reality,
stakeholders and decisionmakers should approach water-resource issues
somewhat differently than they would under the traditional rules.
No one, not even the owner of vested senior water rights, should assume that her interests are safe simply because she is entitled to protecId. at 35.
236 MARC'REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 13 (1986).

237 Dan Tarlock, Reallocation: It Really Is Here, in WATER LAw TRENDS, POLICIES AND
PRACTICE 104, 110 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995). Tarlock offers

the following explanation for this phenomenon:
Many water rights transfers remove water from agricultural use and dedicate the
rights to urban use. Rural communities consider themselves at risk from these transfers because they threaten the community's economic base and way of life. While
water law has traditionally provided little protection for these communities beyond
the political process, these communities are increasingly successful, even after reapportionment, in achieving direct legislative protection for these interests. Nostalgia
for a mythic past is a powerful political weapon worldwide. These interests will be
asserted in the courts as well. In response to these concerns, modern water law is
developing a number of ad hoc mechanisms to assess costs and benefits of large-scale
transfers to address and mitigate the environmental and social equity issues. Many
new state and federal water laws may be used to restrain transfers to protect the area
of origin or the status quo among existing users. Collectively, these new laws pose
significant new constraints on transfers, and perhaps on the efficient allocation of
water resources.
Id. at 105.
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tion under basic water law rules. Those rules routinely have not been
238
applied or have been changed, harming junior appropriators sometimes,
seniors sometimes, 239 and instream flows nearly every time. 240 Anyone
with an interest in a water-resource must actively and vigilantly defend it,
or risk having that interest impaired for the sake of some other user group.
In addition, anyone considering a proposal, strategy, or scenario involving water use should evaluate it on the assumption that the status quo
will be protected. For example, in evaluating whether a state management
plan that emphasizes water law enforcement is sufficient to avert an Endangered Species Act listing, the federal government should ask: Is this
likely to work? Will the state actively enforce the law against existing
water users and make it stick? A group of irrigators considering a lawsuit
to protect their water supply against other users should ask: Can I expect
a court to shut off existing users? If so, will the legislature step in to protect them? A state agency establishing policy for water use during
droughts should ask: If we waive certain rules for water users during
drought periods, will we be able to reinstate those rules when the drought
is over? Or will the users find a way to continue the practices they started
during the drought? Obviously, it would be foolish to assume that the law
will never mean anything at all. But one should question any approach that
relies on any level or any branch of government to enforce the law against
established water uses.
Finally, while the states obviously have great concern with protecting
existing water uses, they otherwise seem to have little regard for preserving western water law. The elements of traditional water law that remain
most strong and vital-water rights as property rights, which last forever
unless abandoned, with priority based on seniority-are the elements that
most effectively safeguard established uses. Most of the other elements
are either moribund (such as the prohibition against waste), 241 rarely enforced (forfeiture), 242 or readily changed (appurtenancy). 24 To the extent
that the traditional rules remain relevant, it is not because they provide a
legal framework of any inherent rightness or power. Instead, they persist
largely because water politics in the 1990s still favors existing water users
who defend their current practices and continuing entitlements based on
2
economics and equity. 44
Traditional western water law does not directly recognize political,
economic, or equitable concerns. 245 But by managing water based largely
on these factors, states tacitly recognize that prior appropriation forms an
imperfect and incomplete basis for water policy and management. In a
238 See supra notes 97-102, 133-36 and accompanying text.

239 See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
244 See Mastin, supra note 112, for an argument that equity requires -preserving established water uses against "unfair" state laws.
245 See Tarlock, supra note 237, at 104.
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sense, when states go outside the traditional rules of western water law to
preserve the status quo, they sacrifice prior appropriation for a kind of
"public interest," even where the interest being protected is a private
246
water use that actually violates current laws.
In sum, by consistently choosing to protect established water uses
rather than applying the familiar rules of prior appropriation, the Northwest states have significantly undermined those rules. The region's water
law and policy is now based more on today's notions of politics, economics, and equity than on any set of long-standing, bedrock principles. These
notions will eventually change, however, and the water users now benefiting from the status quo policy may someday wish that the states had been
more faithful to the traditional rules of western water law.

246 The Idaho legislature expressly declared that it was in the public interest to preserve
current water uses that resulted from past illegal enlargements and transfers. IDAHO CODE
§§ 42-1425(1)(b), 42-1426(1) (1994). And Idaho Department of Water Resources Director
Keith Higginson had argued against cutting off junior groundwater users for the benefit of
senior appropriators, stating that "a decision has to be made in the public interest as to
whether those who are impacted by groundwater development are unreasonably blocking
full use of the resource." Musser v. Higginson, 871 P.2d 809, 813 (Idaho 1994).

